Tag Archives: Financial Stability Board

Timeline For “Bail-In” Of G20 Banking System

14 Jul

This-Is-What-It-Feels-Like-To-Have-Your-Life-Savings-Confiscated-By-The-Global-Elite

How did it happen?

How did we come to a place where an unknown, unelected body of bankers and bureaucrats — chaired since its inception by former Goldman Sachs men — has duped the G20 heads of government into endorsing a scheme to “bail-in” the insolvent private sector banking system by stealing the savings of taxpayers?

Financial Stability Board: Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, October 2011 (click to enlarge)

Financial Stability Board: Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, October 2011 (click to enlarge)

How did we come to a place where the European Union, the UK, the USA, Canada, and now Australia and New Zealand, have all begun implementing a new regime for “addressing the problem” of “moral hazard” associated with government bail outs for “too-big-to-fail” financial firms — supposedly “without exposing the taxpayer to the risk of loss” — by stealing the savings of taxpayers?

FSB – G-SIFI, Nov 4, 2011 (click to enlarge)

FSB – G-SIFI, Nov 4, 2011 (click to enlarge)

Here is the timeline to date (click the links to verify original sources):

FEBRUARY, 1999 – Following recommendations by then President of the Deutsche Bundesbank (German central bank) and later the Vice-Chairman (2003-present) of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Hans Tietmeyer, G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors endorse the creation of a new body, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF). It is funded by the BIS, and based in Basel, Switzerland.

Former Goldman Sachs vice chairman and managing director, and now President of the European Central Bank (ECB), Mario Draghi, is appointed the first chairman of the FSF. Its stated purpose is to promote stability in the international financial system“:

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30 MAY, 2006Chairman and CEO of Goldman Sachs from 1999-2006, Henry “Hank” Paulson, appointed Secretary of the Treasury by George W. Bush. During his tenure at Goldman, it became a major player in the creation and sale of collateralised debt obligations (CDO’s), including subprime mortgage-backed securities ($135 billion from 2001-2007). A tax loophole introduced under former President George HW Bush enables Paulson to meet the conflict of interest preconditions for assuming a government position, by “divesting” most of his $700 million fortune in Goldman Sachs’ stock, tax-free.

During Paulson’s first 15 months as Secretary of the Treasury, Goldman Sachs sells $30 billion in toxic mortgage products to pension funds, foreign banks and other investors (including a 59% increase in 2006), and makes billions betting against its own products. In 2006 and 2007, as the housing bubble bursts, Goldman distributes $22.3 billion in year-end profit-sharing rewards to its 31,000 employees and $112 million in bonuses to Paulson’s successor, Lloyd Blankfein.

15 SEPTEMBER, 2008Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy; credit crunch; stockmarket panic; Global Financial Crisis:

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21 SEPTEMBER, 2008 – On a Sunday, Goldman Sachs is authorised to change its investment bank status, and becomes a traditional bank holding company, thus making it eligible for bailout funds.

26 SEPTEMBER, 2008 – French President Nicholas Sarkozy says “we must rethink the financial system from scratch”.

29 SEPTEMBER, 2008 – USA’s House of Representatives rejects the $700 billion Wall Street bank bailout bill promoted by Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Paulson. Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) index plummets 777 points:

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1 OCTOBER, 2008 – US House of Representatives agrees to “bail out” Wall Street’s too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks, passing amended Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, including the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) enabling the government to purchase up to $700 billion in “toxic assets” such as mortgage-backed securities (derivatives) from private sector banks. Despite being a prime cause of the subprime meltdown, Goldman Sachs is the largest individual recipient of public funds ($12.9 billion) from the bailout of insurance giant, AIG, makes $2.9 billion from “proprietary trades” on its own AIG account, and receives a further $10 billion directly from the US Treasury as an “investment” in preferred stock:

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7 OCTOBER, 2008 – World Bank President Robert Zoellick calls for “a new multilateral network for a new global economy”, says that “We will not create a new world simply by remaking the old”.

13 OCTOBER, 2008 – British Prime Minister Gordon Brown says “We must create a new international financial architecture for the global age”, and that “We are proposing a world leaders’ meeting in which we must agree the principles and policies for restructuring the financial system across the globe”.

15 NOVEMBER, 2008 – First ever summit meeting for heads of government of the Group of Twenty (previously, a G20 summit of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors held since 1999). Titled the “Leaders Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy”, the Washington Summit agrees on an “Action Plan” for financial market reform. It includes an expansion of the Financial Stability Forum to include emerging countries such as China:

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2 APRIL, 2009 – G20 London Summit Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System gives the freshly renamed Financial Stability Board (FSB) a “broadened mandate” and “enhanced capacity”:

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8 NOVEMBER, 2010 – FSB report to the G20 Progress since the Washington Summit on the Implementation of the G20 Recommendations for Strengthening Financial Stability states that “Good progress has been made in defining a policy framework to address the moral hazard risks posed by systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs)”, and that “The FSB is submitting to the G20 Seoul Summit a set of recommendations and timelines for implementation of this framework”:

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Within the “recommendations”, for the first time the spectre of “bail-in” of banks is formally (though blink-and-you-miss-it briefly) mentioned —

“…higher loss absorbency could be drawn from a menu of viable alternatives and could be achieved by a combination of capital surcharges, contingent capital and bail-in debt:

FSB_Update_bail-in

11-12 NOVEMBER, 2010 – G20 Seoul Summit endorses “the policy framework, work processes and timelines proposed by the FSB to reduce the moral hazard risks posed by systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and address the too-big-to-fail problem”, “without… exposing the taxpayers to the risk of loss”:

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4 NOVEMBER, 2011 – Former Goldman Sachs co-head of sovereign risk and managing director of investment banking, chairman of the Bank for International Settlements’ Committee on the Global Financial System, and Governor of the central Bank of Canada, Mark Carney, is appointed the new chairman of the Financial Stability Board. He replaces fellow Goldman Sachs alumnus and current European Central Bank President, Mario Draghi.

4 NOVEMBER, 2011 – FSB states that “the development of the critical policy measures that form the parts of this framework has now been completed. Implementation of these measures will begin from 2012:

FSB_Implementation_from_2012

The FSB’s Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions expressly identifies “bail-in” of banks as one of the “powers” that must be given to a single “Resolution authority” for each nation (G20) or jurisdiction (EU):

Financial Stability Board: Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, October 2011 (click to enlarge)

Financial Stability Board: Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, October 2011 (click to enlarge)

In the preamble, it is stated that one of the objectives is to make it possible for “unsecured and uninsured creditors to absorb losses”:

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Each nation or jurisdiction is required to set up a “Resolution authority”, which is to be “responsible for exercising the resolution powers over firms…”:

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The Resolution authority is to be given power to “transfer or sell assets and liabilities, legal rights and obligations, including deposit liabilities and ownership in shares, to a solvent third party,”without consent:

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Key Attribute 3.3 clearly states that any transfer of a bank’s assets or liabilities (ie, deposits) by the Resolution authority “should not require the consent of any interested party or creditor to be valid”, and, that any such action will not be deemed a “default” of the bank’s legal obligations –

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25 JUNE, 2012 – Government of Cyprus requests bailout from the EU, due to losses in its banking system associated with the Greek debt crisis.

10 DECEMBER, 2012 – A joint paper by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (USA) and the Bank of England (UK) titled Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Important, Financial Institutions states that “the authorities in the United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (U.K.) have been working together to develop resolution strategies that could be applied to their largest financial institutions”:

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FDIC and BoE: Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Important, Financial Institutions, December 2012 (click to enlarge)

FDIC and BoE: Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Important,
Financial Institutions, December 2012 (click to enlarge)

It further identifies that “This work has taken place in connection with the implementation of the G20 Financial Stability Board’s Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions”:

FDIC and BoE: Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Important, Financial Institutions, December 2012 (click to enlarge)

FDIC and BoE: Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Important,
Financial Institutions, December 2012 (click to enlarge)

The paper explains that its focus is “the application of ‘top-down’ resolution strategies that involve a single resolution authority applying its powers to the top of a financial group”, and how such a strategy could be implemented “for a U.S. or a U.K. financial group in a cross-border context”:

FDIC and BoE: Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Important, Financial Institutions, December 2012 (click to enlarge)

FDIC and BoE: Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Important,
Financial Institutions, December 2012 (click to enlarge)

With regard to the USA, it explains that “the strategy has been developed in the context of the powers provided by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, and that such a strategy would “assign losses to shareholders and unsecured creditors (meaning, bank depositors):

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With regard to the UK, it explains that “the strategy has been developed on the basis of the powers provided by the U.K. Banking Act 2009 and in anticipation of the further powers that will be provided by the European Union Recovery and Resolution Directive, and that the strategy would “involve the bail-in (write-down or conversion) of creditors at the top of the group in order to restore the whole group to solvency”:

FDIC and BoE: Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Important, Financial Institutions, December 2012 (click to enlarge)

FDIC and BoE: Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Important,
Financial Institutions, December 2012 (click to enlarge)

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The paper expressly identifies the origin of the “framework” for the bail-in strategy as being the FSB —

“It should be stressed that the application of such a strategy can be achieved only within a legislative framework that provides authorities with key resolution powers. The FSB Key Attributes have established a crucial framework for the implementation of an effective set of resolution powers and practices into national regimes”:

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14 MARCH, 2013Reserve Bank of New Zealand releases draft Open Bank Resolution policy, which includes “bail-in” for failing banks using depositors’ money.

16 MARCH, 2013 – Cypriot Government agrees to EU-imposed conditions for receiving bail out funds, terms which include “bail-in” of Cypriot banks using depositors’ savings.

Cyprus is widely seen as a template for similar actions throughout the EU and the world. Forbes magazine states that “A new strategy has been unveiled around the world, with the first test run in Cyprus. Despite early denials, the ‘bail-in’ strategy for insolvent banks has already become official policy throughout Europe and internationally as well.”

21 MARCH, 2013 – Canadian Government’s Economic Action Plan 2013 states that “The Government proposes to implement a ‘bail-in’ regime for systemically important banks”, aimed at recapitalising failing banks by “the very rapid conversion of certain bank liabilities into regulatory capital”. It further states that “This will reduce risks for taxpayers”:

Canada Budget 2013 Economic Action Plan, March 21, 2013, page 145 (click to enlarge)

Canada Budget 2013 Economic Action Plan, March 21, 2013, page 145 (click to enlarge)

14 MAY, 2013 – Australian Government Budget 2013-14 Portfolio Budget Statement for the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority identifies implementation of the FSB-directed bank bail-in regime as a key strategic objective for 2013-14 —

“consolidate the prudential framework by enhancing prudential standards where appropriate, in line with the global reform initiatives endorsed by the G20 and overseen by the Financial Stability Board:

page 134, Portfolio Budget Statements, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Australian Government Budget 2013-14, 14 May 2013 (click to enlarge)

page 134, Portfolio Budget Statements, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Australian Government Budget 2013-14, 14 May 2013 (click to enlarge)

20 MAY, 2013 – The European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs committee issues a press release stating that “The case in Cyprus showed how important it is to have clear procedures for making shareholders, bondholders and ultimately depositors foot the bill”.

Bank of England deputy governor Paul Tucker says that draft EU bank rescue laws would be a milestone towards “a global system”.

JUNE, 2013 – Reserve Bank of New Zealand releases its Open Bank Resolution (OBR) Pre-positioning Requirements Policy, stating that the OBR provides the flexibility to assign losses to creditors (meaning, bank depositors):

Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Open Bank Resolution (OBR) Pre-positioning Requirements Policy, June 2013 (click to enlarge)

Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Open Bank Resolution (OBR) Pre-positioning Requirements Policy, June 2013 (click to enlarge)

In Definitions, the OBR states that “‘Customer account’, ‘customer liabilities’, or ‘customer liability accounts’ are unsecured liabilities of the bank represented by a range of products such as cheques, savings and other transactional accounts and including term deposits, and that these are considered “in-scope for pre-positioning”:

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The OBR further states that “The Implementation Plan is a key part of the documented evidence that pre-positioned arrangements to quickly close the bank, freeze a portion of customers’ claims to meet potential losses, and reopen the next business day and continue banking services, are in place”:

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The first requirement for “Pre-positioning” is stated as being “That the bank can be closed promptly at any time of the day and on any day of the week, freezing in full all liabilities and preventing access by customers and counterparties to their accounts”:

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27 JUNE, 2013 – The European Union agrees on “bail-in” rules as part of the Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive.

1 JULY, 2013 – Mark Carney appointed to a second term as chairman of the FSB; also becomes Governor of the Bank of England.

3 JULY 2013 – The Financial Times warns that the EU’s newly agreed ‘Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive’ “swings Europe from one extreme – a system laden with implicit government guarantees that protected bank creditors from bearing losses – to the other”, and “risks old-style bank runs”.

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To be continued…

Observant readers will note that the G20 heads of government endorsed the FSB’s “recommendations” (Seoul, Nov 2010) a full year before the FSB actually completed their “framework”, and finally documented that the power to bail-in the banks using depositors’ savings would be a requirement (“Key Attributes…”, Nov 2011). Prior to this, the only reference to the possibility of bail-in (with no mention of depositors) was one obscure, and very brief, reference in the FSB’s 2010 “Progress…” report to the G20 Seoul Summit; the report on which the G20 leaders based their decision to formally endorse, and implement, the yet-to-be-completed FSB framework —

“…higher loss absorbency could be drawn from a menu of viable alternatives and could be achieved by a combination of capital surcharges, contingent capital and bail-in debt.”

Amidst all the celebrity shoulder-rubbing, champagne, caviar, and photo ops, I wonder how many of the G20 leaders actually read the document, much less noticed that tiny part.

Or — if any of them did — if any had the first clue what it meant.

See also:

G20 Governments All Agreed To Cyprus-Style Theft Of Bank Deposits … In 2010

Australia Plans Cyprus-Style “Bail-In” Of Banks In 2013-14 Budget

But The Sheep Don’t Scatter: Banks Say “Sophisticated” Customers Have “Less Stable” Deposits

The Bank Deposits Guarantee Is No Guarantee At All

Think You’ve Got Cash In The Bank? Think Again

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Growing Political Deception On Bank Deposits Theft

4 Jun

Truth-Lies

On All Fool’s Day 2013, this blog published the exposé — since cross-posted on globalresearch.ca — that G20 Governments All Agreed to Cyprus-Style Theft Of Bank Deposits In 2010.

It is telling to observe how politicians (and the media) worldwide are using the deceitful art of sophistry to obscure this truth.

As they all begin to pass the necessary legislation to enact what they have already agreed to — in secret, without providing clear and transparent advice to the public — they are seeking to subtly imply that these measures are needed as a result of what happened in Cyprus.

When the truth is, little Cyprus was just the first test case for implementing the Goldman Sachs-headed internationalist Financial Stability Board’s new bank “bail-in” regime, agreed to by all G20 Prime Ministers and Presidents nearly 3 years ago.

Ponder carefully the emphasised passage in the following Reuter’s news story:

EU draft bank rescue law would not shield big deposits

(Reuters) – A draft law that a group of European Union lawmakers voted for on Monday would shield small depositors from losing their savings in future bank rescues, but customers with more than 100,000 euros in savings when a bank failed could suffer losses.

A group of lawmakers in the European Parliament’s economics committee overwhelmingly voted that, from 2016, large depositors in the EU might suffer losses if a bank gets into serious trouble. The plan was similar to a deal in Cyprus, where wealthy depositors at two banks took hits to save the country from bankruptcy.

Under the EU proposal, a bank would dip into large deposits of over 100,000 euros once it had exhausted other avenues such as shareholders and bondholders. But deposits under 100,000 euros would be spared.

“The case in Cyprus showed how important it is to have clear procedures for making shareholders, bondholders and ultimately depositors foot the bill,” a press release from the committee said after the vote.

See what I mean? The Cyprus “bail-in” test case, deceitfully used as an example of why governments supposedly need to pass legislation for “similar” actions in their own countries … legislation that they already agreed to pass anyway, nearly 3 years ago.

EU finance ministers agreed last week that large, uninsured depositors should be subject to losses but some countries may still seek some flexibility on how they wind down their banks.

The “finance ministers” agreed, “last week”?

This is a deception.

As shown previously, the Prime Ministers and Presidents of the G20 nations all agreed to the policy framework laid down by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) at the Seoul G20 Summit, way back in 2010.

A framework that explicitly includes “bail-in” of banks, using the deposits (i.e, savings) of bank “creditors”:

“Carry out bail-in within resolution as a means to achieve or help achieve continuity of essential functions…”

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There is something else that is very important to note.

The FSB, politicians, bankers, and bureaucrats all want you to believe that these new procedures might only place at some risk the savings of so-called “large” or “big” depositors.

This is untrue.

The FSB-recommended “powers” for the G20 nations’ new bank “resolution authorities” exhibit Orwellian deception and moral relativism at their finest. Embedded within their recommended “Safeguards”, is a caveat allowing those “resolution authorities” to act with impunity when it comes to the theft of depositors’ money:

“Resolution powers should be exercised in a way that respects the hierarchy of claims while providing flexibility to depart from the general principle of equal (pari passu) treatment of creditors of the same class…”

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In other words, whether you have more than (say) 100,000 Euro/Dollars/Pounds deposited in a bank, or less, it is recommended (by Goldman Sachs’ FSB) that G20 governments legislate powers enabling their “resolution authorities” the “flexibility” to treat you any way they see fit.

“Equal treatment” is only a “general principle” to these people.

You may be wondering, if G20 governments all agreed to this way back in 2010, then why are we only now seeing nations from Canada to Europe beginning to draft and pass bank “bail-in” legislation, behind a smokescreen of lies and deceit?

As can be seen from the FSB press release of November 2011:

“Implementation of these measures will begin from 2012. Full implementation is targeted for 2019.”

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Some nations’ politicians are simply moving faster than others, in the coordinated drive towards the ultimate goal of stealing your savings, in order to “bail-in” so-called “systemically important” banks:

Earlier on Monday, Bank of England Deputy Governor Paul Tucker said the EU law on bank recovery and resolution would be a milestone towards a global system.

G20 Governments All Agreed To Cyprus-Style Theft Of Bank Deposits … In 2010

1 Apr
FSB - G-SIFI, Nov 4, 2011 (click to enlarge)

FSB – G-SIFI, Nov 4, 2011 (click to enlarge)

November 11-12, 2010.

Armistice Day.

That is when all the major governments of the G20 first agreed to implement the new, Cyprus-style “bail-in” regime, at the direction of the internationalist Financial Stability Board under its new, GFC-enabled “broadened mandate”

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The pretext?

Financial stability, of course.

“Addressing the ‘too-big-to-fail’ problem”.

With a “new international standard”.

Specifically, “to enable authorities to resolve failing financial firms in an orderly manner without exposing the taxpayer to the risk of loss.”

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One cannot help but laugh at the Orwellian doublespeak slogans used by the architects of this new regime.

To address the problem of “systemically important” banks, “without exposing the taxpayer to the risk of loss,” our puppet politicians have agreed to confiscate … the savings of taxpayers.

Yes, today is All Fools’ Day. And no, you can’t make this $h!t up.

You may be thinking that this excerpt from an FSB press release does not prove that the G20 have specifically agreed to confiscation of bank deposits. And you would be correct.

As with all such schemes, it is not intended that the public will easily discover what has been planned. You have to wade carefully through all the verbose (and deliberately obtuse) technocrat-ese, and cross-reference the supporting documents (and their annexes), in order to discover just what our G20 attendee politicians – geniuses like “World’s Greatest Treasurer” Wayne Swan – have actually signed up to.

And to find the smoking gun.

One with the word B A I L – I N stamped clearly on its barrel.

cartoon_stickup-cyprus-bank_robbery_of_the_cypriot_people

First, in the FSB press release of 4 Nov 2011 we are told that the G20 allegedly “asked the FSB to develop a policy framework to address the systemic and moral hazard risks associated with systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs).”

Next, in Seoul 2010, “G20 leaders endorsed this framework and the timelines and processes for its implementation.”

That framework is set out in the FSB’s “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions” (pdf).

In the preamble of that document, we learn that one of the objectives is to make it possible for “unsecured and uninsured creditors to absorb losses.”  Meaning, if your savings are not covered by some form of government guarantee or federal insurance (for all that is worth) – or if, as in Australia, the government bank deposits guarantee is limited to an amount significantly less than (ie, 1/10th) the total of actual bank deposits held by the public – then your bank account can be made to “absorb losses”. And as we will see shortly, this can be done entirely without your consent –

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In the sub-points of the preamble, we see that G20 governments are expected to “have in place a recovery and resolution plan (“RRP”) … containing all elements set out in Annex III.”

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Each jurisdiction is required to set up a “Resolution authority”, which is to be “responsible for exercising the resolution powers over firms…”

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The Resolution authority’s powers are most interesting. For example, we can all applaud the idea that such an authority could (not that they actually would) “claw-back” bankers’ bonuses –

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What is of serious concern though, is its power to “transfer or sell assets and liabilities, legal rights and obligations, including deposit liabilities and ownership in shares, to a solvent third party,”without consent

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This is confirmed in Key Attribute 3.3, where it is clearly stated that any transfer of a bank’s assets or liabilities (ie, deposits) by the authority “should not require the consent of any interested party or creditor to be valid”, and, that any such action will not be deemed a “default” of the bank’s legal obligations –

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Now if you are still sceptical that all this means the G20 have specifically agreed to a new regime that might include provisions for a Cyprus-style “bail-in” using depositors’ savings, then perhaps it is because you – like me – would be looking for this exact phrase in order to be fully convinced.

Yes, it is there. 

Lucky number (ix) in the “powers” (page 7-8) of the Resolution authority that each of the G20 governments agreed to establish, back in 2010 –

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Note that not only can the Resolution authority use a “bail-in” to support “continuity of essential functions” of a failing bank; it can also do so in order to finance the setting up of a new third party or “bridge” institution, into which the failed (“non-viable”) bank’s assets or liabilities (ie, your savings) can be transferred. Not so you can get your money back, but for the purpose of “capitalising” the new institution.

At that other elite lucky number (xi), we see another power; to shut banks, suspend payments to customers (except for payments to “central counterparties”, ie, to central banks, quelle surprise), and impose a “stay” on actions by creditors (eg, deposit holders) to “collect money”

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You may have noticed that the “bail-in” power at (ix) referenced Key Attribute 3.5. There, we see that the power to carry out a bail-in “should” (how comforting) be performed “in a manner that respects the hierarchy of claims in liquidation.” This no doubt will reassure the more gullible reader that there is nothing nefarious in this plan; that it is clearly intended that the traditional hierarchy of claims in a bank insolvency would be respected

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So, what exactly is the “hierarchy of claims” under this new FSB-dictated regime? Again we have to refer to another section (Key Attribute 5.1) to find the answer.  Which does indeed appear to support the traditional hierarchy of claims. Except for this stunning caveat –

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It is worth repeating –

“Resolution powers should be exercised in a way that respects the hierarchy of claims while providing flexibility to depart from the general principle of equal (pari passu) treatment of creditors of the same class…”

Moral relativism at its finest.

This is what has happened in Cyprus. While the final details are still evolving as to exactly how much Cypriot depositors holding more, or less, than €100k will have stolen from them, what is clear is that this FSB template for bail-ins in G20 nations or “jurisdictions” (EU), is the one being followed.

What is also clear, especially in light of recent revelations that Canada has expressly identified “bail-in” procedures in their 2013 Budget, is that all Western governments have, unbeknown to their citizens and without their consent, agreed to the imposition of the same new regime for managing insolvent banks.

A regime devised, and dictated by, an unelected central body.

Feel free to check these documents for yourself, here (pdf) and here (pdf).

Are you wondering who and what is the Financial Stability Board?

According to their website:

The FSB has been established to coordinate at the international level the work of national financial authorities and international standard setting bodies and to develop and promote the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector policies. It brings together national authorities responsible for financial stability in significant international financial centres, international financial institutions, sector-specific international groupings of regulators and supervisors, and committees of central bank experts.

A list of institutions represented on the FSB can be found here .

The FSB is chaired by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada. Its Secretariat is located in Basel, Switzerland, and hosted by the Bank for International Settlements.

Got that?

A kind of “super regulator”. Chaired currently by a Goldman Sachs man. With membership comprising the central bankers, treasury department heads, and prudential regulators of 24 nations, along with the IMF, World Bank, and a cavalcade of others.

Including – and “hosted by” – the central bank of central banks.

The Bank for International Settlements (BIS).

According to its Articles of Association, the FSB is also funded by the BIS –

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According to its updated Charter (pdf), the FSB received its original mandate from the central bankers and Finance Ministers of the G7 nations in 1999.

It then received a “broadened mandate” from the “Heads of State and Government of the Group of Twenty” at a meeting in London on April 2, 2009 –

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At the same meeting, another now-infamous Goldman Sachs alumnus and current President of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, was appointed Chairman of the FSB

FSB - History (click to enlarge)

FSB – History (click to enlarge)

So… the hapless G20 heads of government, panicking in the midst of the GFC, gave the fonts of central banking wisdom at the FSB a “broadened mandate”, and “asked” them “to develop a policy framework to address the systemic and and moral hazard risks associated with systemically important financial institutions”, did they?

And under the consecutive chairmanships of Goldman Sachs men, these unelected bankers and bureaucrats – not one of whom warned of the approaching GFC – devised this “bail-in” policy for the whole of the G20, to solve the problem of Too-Big-To-Fail banks?

As the Machiavellian-minded so often say:

“Never let a good crisis go to waste”

See also:

Imagine A World With No Banks

The People’s NWO: Every Man His Own Central Banker

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