Archive | February, 2013

A History Of The Legal Case Against Usury

24 Feb
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Schistosoma mansoni is an endoparasite that lives in human blood vessels.

Regular readers will know that I am an ardent opponent of the practice of usury.

In the classical meaning of the word.

Indeed, it is my view that the practice of usury is The Key to the power of the money-lenders.

While many others have argued that the key to their power is their exclusive right to create money (debt) whenever they make a loan, I tend to disagree.

In the absence of the legal right to charge interest (usury) on those loans, the money-lenders’ power would be effectively nobbled.

They could be replaced by full public banking. Or by alternate, free currency solutions like my own.

This key issue of the charging of interest on “money” lending, its origins, and its legal history, is awash with myths, theories, distortions, and outright falsehoods.

There are many eloquent and brilliant advocates for the alleged “need” for the charging (and offering) of a rate of usury on money. The theory of the so-called “time-value of money” is commonly cited in justification of what is, in truth, plain and simple parasitism –

Parasitism is a non-mutual relationship between organisms of different species where one organism, the parasite, benefits at the expense of the other, the host.

First used in English 1539, the word parasite comes from the Medieval French parasite, from the Latin parasitus, the latinisation of the Greek παράσιτος (parasitos), “one who eats at the table of another” and that from παρά (para), “beside, by” + σῖτος (sitos), “wheat”. Coined in English in 1611, the word parasitism comes from the Greek παρά (para) + σιτισμός (sitismos) “feeding, fattening.”

What I hope to do in today’s post is dispel some of the banking industry’s most powerful falsehoods.  That the charging (and offering) of “interest” on money is normal. That, at worst, it is a “necessary evil”.  That it is really something natural, and good, like a law of the universe, and vital to keeping our world turning.

I also hope to encourage readers to STOP using the banksters’ language.

And instead, to “call each thing by its right name.”

The original word used for the charging of interest on money … is USURY.

Usury does not mean charging “excessive” rates of interest.

The etymology of the word “usury” shows that it originally meant the charging of any interest, at all:

usury (n.)

c.1300, from Medieval Latin usuria, from Latin usura “usury, interest,” from usus, from stem of uti (see use (v.)). Originally the practice of lending money at interest, later, at excessive rates of interest.

How very convenient for the modern day money-lenders, that we have changed our language over the centuries.

No doubt with more than a little help from our “friends”.

In researching for more information on the origins of the word “usury”, recently I happened across an article published in the American Bar Association Journal, Volume 51, September 1965. It was written by a J.L. Bernstein, NYU Law School graduate and editor-in-chief of the New York State Bar journal. Following are some extended excerpts. It really is fascinating stuff.

But if you are tempted to leave before finishing, please do me one favour. Skip to the end, and read my closing observations concerning ancient Sumeria, the true origin of debt jubilees and New Year’s Eve celebrations, and the deeper meaning behind the Biblical story of Abraham.

Now, to the history of the legal case against usury (my bold emphasis added):

Background of a Gray Area in Law: The Checkered Career of Usury

Tracing the ancient and medieval history and development of usury, Mr Bernstein shows that at first it was any charge for the use of property, but later became only the charge of excessive interest on money. With the advent of our present consumer society, various procedures and methods of conditional selling have enabled what might otherwise be usury to escape illegality. It is time, the author suggests, to delineate what is fact and what is fiction in this shadowy world.

A CASE MAY BE MADE for usury as one of the oldest professions of man, yet the complexities of modern economic life “make fundamental a review” of the problem, as the late C.S. Lewis, Oxford and Cambridge don, scholar and theologian pointed out. The checkered career of usury cum interest is too long to detail here, but this mixed question of theology and law has always been a gray area for the courts – a veritable hodgepodge of legal decision, as this Journal once put it, with “no clearcut rationale”.

Even an elementary statement in a leading New Jersey case is questionable. The Supreme Court said: “Although the common law did not prohibit usurious exactions, our statutes have done so since 1738.” This view of the common law is challenged in Mark Ord’s authoritative Essay on the Law of Usury (1809), which states: “Usury in its strict and legal sense was always considered unlawful.” Likewise, Robert Buckley Comyn says: “Usury was in England an object of hatred and legal animadversion at least as early as the time of Alfred; and Glanville, Fleta, and Bracton bear ample testimony to the abhorrence in which it was held.”

All Interest Once Was Usury

At common law a usurious contract could not be enforced, and usury appears to have been an indictable offense, the punishment for it being fines and imprisonment. The fact is that from the earliest recorded times until the later Middle Ages even interest was forbidden by both canon and civil law, for interest then was synonymous with usury. Indeed, interest had no significant usage in English law until the statute of 21 Jac. 1, c. 17 (1624), although it had been employed in commerce, having been adapted from the Justinian Code of the Roman Empire.

The Lombard merchants, the principal moneylenders of medieval times, had made it a practice to charge a penalty on default, and the custom spread. Thus interest was not a charge for the use of money, but an exaction to make the creditor “whole”. In time it came to mean permissible usury, but it is noteworthy that neither the Old nor the New Testament recognizes this concept, except for the new Catholic edition of the Holy Bible (1954) which substitutes interest for usury and banker for exchanger.

Comyn describes the gradual transformation: “Usury was an offense which having first become odious from religious prejudices, at length became the object of political consideration, and parliamentary restraint. And as at first the taking of any profit upon money was denominated usury, so afterwards, when such profit was authorized by law, the profit was termed interest, and the illegal excess alone retained the odious name.” Thus usury began as malum in se, but at least from the time of Charlemagne in the ninth century (he considered all profit as “filthy lucre”), the secular arm had sought to reinforce the spiritual, making it also malum prohibitum. Speaking of the earliest English statutes, those of Henry VII (1487-1495), Coke declared that all usury was “damned and prohibited”. According to an ancient book of the Exchequer, entitled Magister et Tiburiensis, usury was ranked with murder as an offense.

But the general detestation was diminished by 37 Hen. 8, c. 9 (1545) which, while entitled “A Bill Against Usury”, tacitly legalized it to a maximum of 10 per cent per annum. This statute inaugurated the serviceable fiction that usury no longer meant any interest, but only excessive interest. As Ord puts it, this was the first English statute to “give any connivance to the practice of lending at interest”.

The statute still called usury “a thing unlawful”; it was an attempt at moderation, following the lead of the church. Earlier attempts to ban all interest had failed ignobly, but so did this new approach, and by 5 & 6 Edward 6, c. 20 (1552), repeal made interest and usury one and the same again. But this didn’t work, as before, and 13 Eliz. 1, c. 8 (1571) repealed the Edwardian edicts and revived the statute of Henry VIII. In order, 21 Jac. 1, c. 17 (1624); 12 Car. 2, c. 13 (1660); and 12 Anne, c. 16 (1713), toyed mainly with the rates, which went from a maximum of 10, to 8, to 6 and finally to 5 per cent in the statue of Anne of 1713. This is the one followed in this country. But the most common maximum rate of 6 per cent is derived from the Justinian Code.

The statute of 12 Anne, which served as a common model here, was abrogated 110 years ago in England by 17 & 18 Vict., c. 90 (1854). Therefore, the mother country has no general usury law today and interest of 48 per cent may be quite legal – even more, if the courts can be convinced. As H. Shields Rose puts it in his book, The Churches and Usury (1908), this was “the final capitulation of the state … as regards the maintenance of a legal maximum rate of interest in England”.

Note:  The abrogation of this 183-year-old English law placing limits on the charging of interest, came just ten years after the privately-owned Bank of England was granted exclusive power to issue the nation’s banknotes (Bank Charter Act, 1844). Coincidence? I think not.

The etymology of usury is from the Latin words usa and aera, meaning “the use of money”. But both by ecclesiastical and civil law it was always held that usury could exist in nonpecuniary transactions as well. Many state statutes, following the language of 12 Anne, speak generally of “money, wares, merchandise, goods and chattels”. The Bible is more inclusive: “Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother; usury of money, usury of victuals, usury of any thing that is lent upon usury.”

But courts that maintain that usury was not prohibited by the common law are on firmer ground if they mean thereby the common law as it was interpreted by the colonial judges here. Blackstone says that the common law of England consists of “That ancient collection of unwritten maxims and customs …”. Our early courts seemed to regard English authority on the subject so dubious, indifferent or contradictory that, without legislative enactment, anything by way of usury was legal. This led to such abuses that the colonists petitioned for action, and general usury statutes were adopted everywhere.

It is useless to deny that confusion abounded in the common law, for usury was no less a gray area and a hodgepodge of thinking then. Coke, for example, said that: “All usury is not only against the law of God [but] the laws of the realm, and against the law of nature.” But on another occasion he avers that what was actually forbidden was “biting usury”, i.e., unconscionable charges…

Note: It is your humble blogger’s firm opinion that, in a technological age where 97% of all “money” is no more than electronic binary code, mere digital bookkeeping entries, created at the click of a bankers’ mouse in the form of new debt, there is no question that ALL usury charges are unconscionable.

Genesis of the Problem Is of Ancient Origin

But if the common law is no less a puzzle than our decisional law, the trouble goes far back – to Holy Writ itself. Until the later Middle Ages all interest was interdicted, for it was abhorrent that money – “barren” as Aristotle and the inspired writers of the early Church had taught – should increase unnaturally while lying fallow. That a lender should profit in his own idleness and that a borrower should be charged even though he may have lost money in the transaction, both were intolerable. Indeed, the worst form of usury in medieval times is considered a most respectable practice in our own. This was the custom of paying interest from the day of the loan. Banks today not only pay interest “from the date of deposit”, but even from before, so that money deposited by the fifteenth of a month will draw interest from the first.

Note how the author first refers to “paying interest from the day of the loan”, then immediately switches gears to speak of banks paying interest “from the day of deposit”? This is a classic and oh so subtle mind trick, commonly used in justification of the practice of charging interest on lending. How so? By redirecting the focus of the argument on the fact that banks pay interest as well.  It is a clever distraction, because what is overlooked, is that banks never pay more interest than they charge. As a so-called “intermediary” in the payments system of the economy, the banks achieve the easiest of profits.  Not just because they charge more interest than they pay, which in itself would be a form of parasitism. But because they are not mere intermediaries – banks are able to create money (debt), and charge interest on it.  Contrary to popular belief, banks do not simply lend out money deposited by other customers. See The World’s Most Immoral Institution Tells You How

We have come a long way in our view of the fertility of money. But, oddly, the statute of James I, which gave the word interest its first significance in Anglo-Saxon law, contained the proviso that “… no words in this statute contained shall be construed or expounded to allow a practice [of charging interest] in point of religion or conscience”. But what did morality actually hold? That is the most vexatious of all inquiries.

The Fifteenth Psalm is clear without cavil: “Lord, who shall abide in thy tabernacle? Who shall dwell in thy holy hill … He that putteth not out his money to usury…”. Throughout the Bible the angry prophets denounce what the early theologians called “horrible and damnable sinne”. But there are also loopholes born of contradiction, and the frustrations of the moralists came to be visited upon the jurists.

Although the quoted passage from Deuteronomy forbids all usury, the next verse is most tantalizing: “Unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon usury; but unto thy brother thou shalt not lend upon usury…”. What does this mean?

Indeed. There is much that can be said, and much evidence raised, in answer to that question.  But we will leave that particular controversy for another time.

From Biblical times until the later Middle Ages, a moneylender was simply a usurer, and a banker an exchanger. The distinction of moderate usury, called interest, received no recognition in the Church until after the Reformation. In a sense, therefore, the liberalization of religious thought also marked the turn to the “Money Society”, in which the medium of exchange achieved the status of a commodity of intrinsic value and became the lifeblood of commerce. The burgeoning materialism of the age, trading on the discovery of the New World, was in a mood no longer to tolerate philosophical and religious thought treating money as “infertile” and profit from it as “unnatural”, since it was not endowed by God or nature “with genital and procreative faculties” in the words of St. Basil (fourth century). In the end, it was the lawgiver, Justinian, who prevailed, rather than the philosophers and theologians.

And there you have it. What has ultimately prevailed with respect to usury, is the code of man. The Corpus Juris Civilis of the “lawgiver”, Justinian, a ruler of the late Roman Empire (c. 529AD), are the foundational documents of the Western legal tradition. It is ancient Roman law that serves as legal justification for the resurrected, and globally-dominating practice of usury in our day.

Theory of Moderate Usury or Interest Is Approved

This same logic, that there is nothing immoral about usury, was advanced in Parliament in the last century during the debates on the proposed abolition of the general usury statute of 12 Anne. “God did not so hate it, that he utterly forbade it”, contended one member; while another stated: “He could not have desired that the ban against all usury should be of moral and universal application”, for the Bible did not so clearly provide. An economist with the United States Treasury Department even advanced the view that usury could be traced “to the Creator Himself”, who first caused “all things to grow and increase”.

Nevertheless, that the total prohibition of all interest was at the center of canonist doctrine until the later Middle Ages is clear. “Not until sixteen hundred years after Christ did interest find any defenders”, proclaimed Roger Fenton. Then it was the Church which led the way to its acceptance, and the State which followed. Two principal reasons may be advanced for it: (1) the growing power of economic forces which chafed under enforced unselfishness and (2) the equivocations of Scriptures which encouraged the casuistries of “permissible instances”. Ultimately, perhaps, it was a hopeless struggle against human cupidity, or maybe only against “progress” for it is unlikely that, no matter what position it assumed, the Church could have stemmed the tide that was running.

Assailed on either side by those who, like St. Basil, called usury “the last pitch of inhumanity” and those who found it out of harmony with the facts of life, the Church sought to steer a middle course. Since its primary object has always been to protect the weak against the economically strong, it saw justifications for exceptions in commercial transactions between sophisticated parties.

“Sophisticated” parties? Now where have we heard that justification used more recently?

Moreover, on the allegation that, after 16 centuries, the Church succumbed to the pressures of economic greed and “progress”, it behooves one to point out that, in doing so, its ecclesiastical leaders and learned theologians all managed to lose sight of the simplest teachings of their own namesake, The Christ: 

“No one can serve two masters: Either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will be devoted to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and money.”

It is this blogger’s view that the vast, unfathomable wealth of “the Church” – the sheer obscenity of which induced a sense of nausea on his sole tour of the Vatican – stands as ample testimony to the identity of which “master” it has long chosen to serve.

“Interest”, laconically comments Roger Fenton, “is the brat of commerce.” By what Mark Twain would have called “theological gymnastics” the Church has been charged with acquiescing in contrivances and subterfuges; and its capitulation to usury – limited or otherwise – has been held to constitute a virtual abdication of the precept against avarice, a former “venal” sin.

The Church first approved the idea of interest as it originated in the Justinian Code, which implied a justified penalty on default, although it is likely that this in itself was a subterfuge to avoid the ban against usury. But theological approval of the dammum emergens, for actual loss incurred, was not satisfactory to business or its lawyers, who argued also for the lucrum cessans, certain gain lost. This the Church resisted for at least a century more, for it was not ready to concede that money, the love of which is “the root of all evil” in the Bible, was fertile. But in time it acceded to this, provided that the money was lent for an initial gratis period. Thus, technically, the interest was still not for the use of money, but as compensation for its nonreturn on the due date.

This attempt at charity led to an ingenious evasion. The grace period, accepted with high good humor in the market place, became a mere sham. The lenders merely fixed a due date so close that borrowers could not hope to repay by then, following which huge penalties were added. The evasion and the practice survive to this day, and the courts commonly enforce, after default, a rate of charge in excess of that permitted by general usury laws. It persists in “revolving” or “flexible” charge accounts, in which no charge is made if a bill is paid within ten days or so, after which interest (called a “service charge”) of 18 per cent is added.

But the Church never approved of lending to the poor in order to profit from their poverty, nor of such things as “consumer’s loans”, formerly called “consumptive loans”, a rather more descriptive phrase. Indeed, to lend for any but productive purposes or to engage in commerce except as a service to the community was still immoral. In 1515 the Lateran Council pronounced: “This is the proper interpretation of usury, when gain is sought to be acquired from the use of a thing not in itself fruitful, without labor, expense or risk, on the part of the lender.” The element of risk loomed larger in importance, but the Church having made distinctions, it was not long before the law of England followed suit. Within thirty years, in 1545, came 37 Hen. 8, the first statute to legalize moderate usury.

Today it is commonly argued that the charging of interest on loans simply represents a fair and reasonable “rate of return” to moneylenders, to compensate them for their “risk” in making the loan.

This is self-serving bunkum.

As we have seen previously, there is no labor or “risk” involved in the modern process of “money” creation and lending. It is simply typed into existence, as a new digital bookkeeping entry. And even when the moneylenders take their money debt-creation schemes to stratospheric levels, blowing asset bubbles that lead to the total insolvency not just of millions of common people, but of their own institutions – (eg) the predatory mortgage lending practices in the USA preceding the GFC – the government conspires with the bankers to make them “whole” again. In the modern era, it is perfectly clear and beyond refutation that the lending of money by the banking system is risk-free … for the bankers.

In closing this post on usury, there is one more piece of research I’d like to share.

Biblically-literate readers will be familiar with the story of Abraham. As the man chosen by God to be “the father of many nations”, he is a central figure in the history of three powerful world faiths and their billions of adherents. Indeed, they are named after him – the “Abrahamic” faiths of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism.

In the Genesis 11-12 account of Abraham, we learn that he lived in the region of ancient Sumeria (or Babylonia), in a place called “Ur of the Chaldees”. God told him to get out of Ur, and to go to a land that He would show him.

The Promised Land.

A metaphor for Heaven.

In David Graeber’s masterful work Debt: The First 5,000 Years, we learn a wealth of fascinating, myth-busting information on the true anthropological history of money, exchange, barter, and debt throughout recorded history. It is a “must read” book.

Many of us would be aware that the earliest written records of humankind are the clay tablet (cuneiform) writings from ancient Sumeria. The concept of a debt jubilee now being revived by Professor Steve Keen has its earliest origins in Sumeria/Babylonia, where actual “money” (eg, coins) was very little used; instead, the economy functioned almost entirely on a system of debts and credits, which (like today) were nothing more than bookkeeping entries, written originally on clay balls, later, on clay slates. The phrase “a clean slate”, meaning to have a fresh start or new beginning, has its origins here. New Year’s Eve celebrations also have their origins here – it was not uncommon practice for Sumerian kings to declare all debts annulled, to destroy all the records of debt and so begin with “a clean slate” in the new year; a cause for joyous celebration if ever there was one!

CunEnv

In chapter 7 of Graeber’s book, we also discover the meaning of the word “Ur,” from an early Sumerian dictionary:

ur (HAR): n, liver; spleen; heart; soul; bulk; main body; foundation; loan; obligation; interest; surplus; profit; interest-bearing debt; repayment; slavewoman.

I think there may well be a significance to the story of Abraham and his journey out of Ur to the Land of Promise, that is both far deeper, and far more practical, than most give it credit for.

Swan Siphons RBA In Failed Attempt To Reach Surplus

23 Feb

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And here you were believing our politicians and media parrots, when they say that the Reserve Bank of Australia is “independent”.

From The Age (via MacroBusiness):

TREASURER Wayne Swan defied objections from the Reserve Bank governor and siphoned half the central bank’s profits into the Budget bottom line to fulfil his political commitment to achieve a surplus.

The Reserve Bank governor, Glenn Stevens, told a parliamentary inquiry that he wrote to Mr Swan, asking him to direct all of the bank’s $1 billion 2011-12 profit to its critically short reserve fund, needed to absorb changes in the value of the bank’s foreign currency holdings. Normally worth around $6 billion, the fund had dwindled to $2 billion.

”It’s a key part of our capital. It has been depleted considerably by the effects of the rising exchange rate,” Mr Stevens told the inquiry. ”I believe the prudent course is to rebuild it as quickly as we can but I am not subject to the other pressures that the government is.”

Mr Swan denied the request, and insisted on taking half the profit as a dividend to help achieve his promise of a budget surplus this financial year.

That promise has since been dumped, leading to the opposition mounting a sustained attack on the government’s fiscal credibility.

”In the end it was his prerogative,” Mr Stevens said. ”He made a judgment, and I had to accept that judgment.”

Another day, another epic fail by our World’s Greatest Treasurer.

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The Truth About Europe’s Banks … And Ours

23 Feb

From Phoenix Capital Research (via ZeroHedge):

Europe is Safe… Just Ask Spanish Depositors… Who Have Lost EVERYTHING

Anyone who wants to get an inside look at both the European banking system and the politicians in charge of fixing it need to only look at Spain’s Bankia.

Bankia was formed in December 2010 by merging seven totally bankrupt Spanish cajas (regional banks that were unregulated). The bank was heralded as a success story and an indication that European Governments could manage the risks in their banking systems.

Indeed, in 2011, Bankia even reported a profit of €41 million. And in April 2012, it was proposing paying a dividend. Then, in the span of two weeks, the bank revised its 2011 profit to a €3.3 billion LOSS, requested a formal bailout from Spain, and had to be nationalized.

What’s striking about this sequence of events is that throughout it, Spain’s Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy was claiming that Spain’s banks were in great shape. Indeed, on May 28 2012, (after Bankia had already requested a €19 billion bailout, the single largest bailout in Spanish history), Rajoy stated , “there will be no rescue of the Spanish banking sector.”

Bear in mind, Spain itself was just days away from requesting outside aid from the EU…

Fast forward to December 2012, and Bankia is again in the news, this time with Spain revealing that despite receiving the largest bailout in Spanish history, the bank still had a NEGATIVE value…

At this point the following is obvious:

  1. Europe’s banks are in far far worse shape than anyone publicly admits
  2. The political class in Europe has no idea how to solve this mess
  3. No one has quantified the bank’s actual losses or their capital needs
  4. Everyone is lying about just about everything related to Europe’s financial system

It’s a little known fact about the Spanish crisis is that when the Spanish Government merges troubled banks, it typically swaps out depositors’ savings for shares in the new bank.

So… when the newly formed bank goes bust, “poof” your savings are GONE. Not gone as in some Spanish version of the FDIC will eventually get you your money, but gone as in gone forever.

This is why Bankia’s collapse is so significant: in one move, former depositors at seven banks just lost virtually everything.

And this in a nutshell is Europe’s financial system today: a totally insolvent sewer of garbage debt, run by corrupt career politicians who have no clue how to fix it or their economies… and which results in a big fat ZERO for those who are nuts enough to invest in it.

Be warned. There are many many more Bankias coming to light in the coming months. So if you have not already taken steps to prepare for systemic failure, you NEED to do so NOW. We’re literally at most a few months, and very likely just a few weeks from Europe’s banks imploding, potentially taking down the financial system with them. Think I’m joking? The Fed is pumping hundreds of BILLIONS of dollars into EU banks right now trying to stop this from happening…

A couple of things worth noting.

Our Aussie banking system is massively leveraged to our housing bubble, and only survived the GFC thanks to being backstopped by the government (using the “government guarantee” of access to taxpayers’ future earnings as collateral).

And in March last year, we saw in The Bank Deposits Guarantee Is No Guarantee At All that your savings are not as safe as you may believe:

There is a hidden flaw in the government’s Bank Deposits Guarantee scheme. One which renders the guarantee largely useless.

The Government Guarantee is just another con-fidence trick, to prevent another bank run … like the silent bank run we had during the GFC peak in late 2008.

Richard Gluyas at The Australian has the story of the Great Big Government Bank Deposits Guarantee … that isn’t (emphasis added):

… There is no doubt that the guarantee, reduced last month to a permanent cap of $250,000 per person per institution, has facilitated the stampede into term deposits.

Flows into products like mortgage funds, and even the booming annuities market, have suffered as a result.

But the question is whether the stampede would be slowed if bank customers read the fine print of the guarantee.

How many of them would know, for example, that the standing appropriation to meet any initial payout of deposits is limited to $20 billion per failed bank?

It might seem like a lot, but it pales when compared to about $200bn in eligible deposits for each major bank.

In the highly unlikely event of a major bank failure, any payments under the Financial Claims Scheme would be recovered through the liquidation of the bank.

An industry levy would be applied if there’s a shortfall from a realisation of assets.

But the fact remains that the initial payout is effectively capped by legislation at $20bn, albeit with provision for the government to go back to the parliament for more.

There is no mention of any of this in Swan’s press release.

After reading that document, you’d come away thinking that the government will cough up for pretty much all bank deposits of less than $250,000 in full.

The reality, though, is that the guarantee underwrites an initial payment, which then gives way to other measures.

The only winners in the banking game … are the bankers.

Everyone else is a loser.

Whether they real-eyes it or not.

When Money Can’t Buy Total Control…

23 Feb

… surveil everyone, using robo-bugs:

The Most Terrifying Drone Video Yet

Science writer John Horgan’s feature on the many ways drones will be used in coming years is interesting throughout, and terrifying in the passage where he describes an effort to build micro-drones that are, as the U.S. Air Force describes them, “Unobtrusive, pervasive and lethal.”

Air Force officials declined a request to observe flight tests at a “micro-aviary” they’ve built, he reported, but they did let him see a video dramatization “starring micro-UAVs that resemble winged, multi-legged bugs. The drones swarm through alleys, crawl across windowsills, and perch on power lines. One of them sneaks up on a scowling man holding a gun and shoots him in the head.”

Here’s that video

Click the link above to glimpse our dystopian future.

Brought to you, as always, by and for the profit (and power) of the money-lenders:

On Banks, Grifting, And Rape

22 Feb

“These satanic deals were the basic currency of the bubble: Jobless dope fiends bought houses with no money down, and the big banks wrapped those mortgages into securities and then sold them off to pensions and other suckers as investment-grade deals.”

Rolling Stone’s Matt Taibbi has done sterling work over the years exposing the truth of one of the biggest, most powerful banking organisations in the world. Here’s one of his pieces from 2010 that is well worth reading.

Why?

If nothing else, to understand the tricks and scams used by the bankers since the GFC – aided and abetted by their own alumni who have long held all the key financial posts in the US government.

But more importantly, to gain an insight into the irredeemably evil, twisted, narcissistic, conscience- and morality-free sociopathic thinking and reasoning that is the soul of modern high finance.

These people are not like you. Or me.

They are demonic.

Their tricks, schemes and deals are – to use Taibbi’s own words – “satanic”.

And it is people exactly like this who are determining what your future will look like:

Wall Street’s Bailout Hustle

Goldman Sachs and other big banks aren’t just pocketing the trillions we gave them to rescue the economy – they’re re-creating the conditions for another crash

On January 21st, Lloyd Blankfein left a peculiar voicemail message on the work phones of his employees at Goldman Sachs. Fast becoming America’s pre-eminent Marvel Comics supervillain, the CEO used the call to deploy his secret weapon: a pair of giant, nuclear-powered testicles. In his message, Blankfein addressed his plan to pay out gigantic year-end bonuses amid widespread controversy over Goldman’s role in precipitating the global financial crisis.

The bank had already set aside a tidy $16.2 billion for salaries and bonuses — meaning that Goldman employees were each set to take home an average of $498,246, a number roughly commensurate with what they received during the bubble years. Still, the troops were worried: There were rumors that Dr. Ballsachs, bowing to political pressure, might be forced to scale the number back. After all, the country was broke, 14.8 million Americans were stranded on the unemployment line, and Barack Obama and the Democrats were trying to recover the populist high ground after their bitch-whipping in Massachusetts by calling for a “bailout tax” on banks. Maybe this wasn’t the right time for Goldman to be throwing its annual Roman bonus orgy.

Not to worry, Blankfein reassured employees. “In a year that proved to have no shortage of story lines,” he said, “I believe very strongly that performance is the ultimate narrative.”

Translation: We made a shitload of money last year because we’re so amazing at our jobs, so fuck all those people who want us to reduce our bonuses.

Goldman wasn’t alone. The nation’s six largest banks — all committed to this balls-out, I drink your milkshake! strategy of flagrantly gorging themselves as America goes hungry — set aside a whopping $140 billion for executive compensation last year, a sum only slightly less than the $164 billion they paid themselves in the pre-crash year of 2007. In a gesture of self-sacrifice, Blankfein himself took a humiliatingly low bonus of $9 million, less than the 2009 pay of elephantine New York Knicks washout Eddy Curry. But in reality, not much had changed. “What is the state of our moral being when Lloyd Blankfein taking a $9 million bonus is viewed as this great act of contrition, when every penny of it was a direct transfer from the taxpayer?” asks Eliot Spitzer, who tried to hold Wall Street accountable during his own ill-fated stint as governor of New York.

Beyond a few such bleats of outrage, however, the huge payout was met, by and large, with a collective sigh of resignation.

Because beneath America’s populist veneer, on a more subtle strata of the national psyche, there remains a strong temptation to not really give a shit. The rich, after all, have always made way too much money; what’s the difference if some fat cat in New York pockets $20 million instead of $10 million?

The only reason such apathy exists, however, is because there’s still a widespread misunderstanding of how exactly Wall Street “earns” its money, with emphasis on the quotation marks around “earns.” The question everyone should be asking, as one bailout recipient after another posts massive profits — Goldman reported $13.4 billion in profits last year, after paying out that $16.2 billion in bonuses and compensation — is this: In an economy as horrible as ours, with every factory town between New York and Los Angeles looking like those hollowed-out ghost ships we see on History Channel documentaries like Shipwrecks of the Great Lakes, where in the hell did Wall Street’s eye-popping profits come from, exactly? Did Goldman go from bailout city to $13.4 billion in the black because, as Blankfein suggests, its “performance” was just that awesome? A year and a half after they were minutes away from bankruptcy, how are these assholes not only back on their feet again, but hauling in bonuses at the same rate they were during the bubble?

The answer to that question is basically twofold: They raped the taxpayer, and they raped their clients.

The bottom line is that banks like Goldman have learned absolutely nothing from the global economic meltdown. In fact, they’re back conniving and playing speculative long shots in force — only this time with the full financial support of the U.S. government. In the process, they’re rapidly re-creating the conditions for another crash, with the same actors once again playing the same crazy games of financial chicken with the same toxic assets as before.

That’s why this bonus business isn’t merely a matter of getting upset about whether or not Lloyd Blankfein buys himself one tropical island or two on his next birthday. The reality is that the post-bailout era in which Goldman thrived has turned out to be a chaotic frenzy of high-stakes con-artistry, with taxpayers and clients bilked out of billions using a dizzying array of old-school hustles that, but for their ponderous complexity, would have fit well in slick grifter movies like The Sting and Matchstick Men. There’s even a term in con-man lingo for what some of the banks are doing right now, with all their cosmetic gestures of scaling back bonuses and giving to charities. In the grifter world, calming down a mark so he doesn’t call the cops is known as the “Cool Off.”

To appreciate how all of these (sometimes brilliant) schemes work is to understand the difference between earning money and taking scores, and to realize that the profits these banks are posting don’t so much represent national growth and recovery, but something closer to the losses one would report after a theft or a car crash. Many Americans instinctively understand this to be true — but, much like when your wife does it with your 300-pound plumber in the kids’ playroom, knowing it and actually watching the whole scene from start to finish are two very different things. In that spirit, a brief history of the best 18 months of grifting this country has ever seen:

THE SWOOP AND SQUAT

By now, most people who have followed the financial crisis know that the bailout of AIG was actually a bailout of AIG’s “counterparties” — the big banks like Goldman to whom the insurance giant owed billions when it went belly up.

What is less understood is that the bailout of AIG counter-parties like Goldman and Société Générale, a French bank, actually began before the collapse of AIG, before the Federal Reserve paid them so much as a dollar. Nor is it understood that these counterparties actually accelerated the wreck of AIG in what was, ironically, something very like the old insurance scam known as “Swoop and Squat,” in which a target car is trapped between two perpetrator vehicles and wrecked, with the mark in the game being the target’s insurance company — in this case, the government.

This may sound far-fetched, but the financial crisis of 2008 was very much caused by a perverse series of legal incentives that often made failed investments worth more than thriving ones. Our economy was like a town where everyone has juicy insurance policies on their neighbors’ cars and houses. In such a town, the driving will be suspiciously bad, and there will be a lot of fires.

AIG was the ultimate example of this dynamic. At the height of the housing boom, Goldman was selling billions in bundled mortgage-backed securities — often toxic crap of the no-money-down, no-identification-needed variety of home loan — to various institutional suckers like pensions and insurance companies, who frequently thought they were buying investment-grade instruments. At the same time, in a glaring example of the perverse incentives that existed and still exist, Goldman was also betting against those same sorts of securities — a practice that one government investigator compared to “selling a car with faulty brakes and then buying an insurance policy on the buyer of those cars.”

Goldman often “insured” some of this garbage with AIG, using a virtually unregulated form of pseudo-insurance called credit-default swaps. Thanks in large part to deregulation pushed by Bob Rubin, former chairman of Goldman, and Treasury secretary under Bill Clinton, AIG wasn’t required to actually have the capital to pay off the deals. As a result, banks like Goldman bought more than $440 billion worth of this bogus insurance from AIG, a huge blind bet that the taxpayer ended up having to eat.

Thus, when the housing bubble went crazy, Goldman made money coming and going. They made money selling the crap mortgages, and they made money by collecting on the bogus insurance from AIG when the crap mortgages flopped.

Still, the trick for Goldman was: how to collect the insurance money. As AIG headed into a tailspin that fateful summer of 2008, it looked like the beleaguered firm wasn’t going to have the money to pay off the bogus insurance. So Goldman and other banks began demanding that AIG provide them with cash collateral. In the 15 months leading up to the collapse of AIG, Goldman received $5.9 billion in collateral. Société Générale, a bank holding lots of mortgage-backed crap originally underwritten by Goldman, received $5.5 billion. These collateral demands squeezing AIG from two sides were the “Swoop and Squat” that ultimately crashed the firm. “It put the company into a liquidity crisis,” says Eric Dinallo, who was intimately involved in the AIG bailout as head of the New York State Insurance Department.

It was a brilliant move. When a company like AIG is about to die, it isn’t supposed to hand over big hunks of assets to a single creditor like Goldman; it’s supposed to equitably distribute whatever assets it has left among all its creditors. Had AIG gone bankrupt, Goldman would have likely lost much of the $5.9 billion that it pocketed as collateral. “Any bankruptcy court that saw those collateral payments would have declined that transaction as a fraudulent conveyance,” says Barry Ritholtz, the author of Bailout Nation. Instead, Goldman and the other counterparties got their money out in advance — putting a torch to what was left of AIG. Fans of the movie Goodfellas will recall Henry Hill and Tommy DeVito taking the same approach to the Bamboo Lounge nightclub they’d been gouging. Roll the Ray Liotta narration: “Finally, when there’s nothing left, when you can’t borrow another buck . . . you bust the joint out. You light a match.”

And why not? After all, according to the terms of the bailout deal struck when AIG was taken over by the state in September 2008, Goldman was paid 100 cents on the dollar on an additional $12.9 billion it was owed by AIG — again, money it almost certainly would not have seen a fraction of had AIG proceeded to a normal bankruptcy. Along with the collateral it pocketed, that’s $19 billion in pure cash that Goldman would not have “earned” without massive state intervention. How’s that $13.4 billion in 2009 profits looking now? And that doesn’t even include the direct bailouts of Goldman Sachs and other big banks, which began in earnest after the collapse of AIG.

THE DOLLAR STORE

In the usual “DollarStore” or “Big Store” scam — popularized in movies like The Sting — a huge cast of con artists is hired to create a whole fake  environment into which the unsuspecting mark walks and gets robbed
over and over again. A warehouse is converted into a makeshift casino or off-track betting parlor, the fool walks in with money, leaves without it.

The two key elements to the Dollar Store scam are the whiz-bang theatrical redecorating job and the fact that everyone is in on it except the mark. In this case, a pair of investment banks were dressed up to look like commercial banks overnight, and it was the taxpayer who walked in and lost his shirt, confused by the appearance of what looked like real Federal Reserve officials minding the store.

Less than a week after the AIG bailout, Goldman and another investment bank, Morgan Stanley, applied for, and received, federal permission to become bank holding companies — a move that would make them eligible for much greater federal support. The stock prices of both firms were cratering, and there was talk that either or both might go the way of Lehman Brothers, another once-mighty investment bank that just a week earlier had disappeared from the face of the earth under the weight of its toxic assets. By law, a five-day waiting period was required for such a conversion — but the two banks got them overnight, with final approval actually coming only five days after the AIG bailout.

Why did they need those federal bank charters? This question is the key to understanding the entire bailout era — because this Dollar Store scam was the big one. Institutions that were, in reality, high-risk gambling houses were allowed to masquerade as conservative commercial banks. As a result of this new designation, they were given access to a virtually endless tap of “free money” by unsuspecting taxpayers. The $10 billion that Goldman received under the better-known TARP bailout was chump change in comparison to the smorgasbord of direct and indirect aid it qualified for as a commercial bank.

When Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley got their federal bank charters, they joined Bank of America, Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase and the other banking titans who could go to the Fed and borrow massive amounts of money at interest rates that, thanks to the aggressive rate-cutting policies of Fed chief Ben Bernanke during the crisis, soon sank to zero percent. The ability to go to the Fed and borrow big at next to no interest was what saved Goldman, Morgan Stanley and other banks from death in the fall of 2008.

“They had no other way to raise capital at that moment, meaning they were on the brink of insolvency,” says Nomi Prins, a former managing director at Goldman Sachs. “The Fed was the only shot.”

In fact, the Fed became not just a source of emergency borrowing that enabled Goldman and Morgan Stanley to stave off disaster — it became a source of long-term guaranteed income. Borrowing at zero percent interest, banks like Goldman now had virtually infinite ways to make money. In one of the most common maneuvers, they simply took the money they borrowed from the government at zero percent and lent it back to the government by buying Treasury bills that paid interest of three or four percent.

It was basically a license to print money — no different than attaching an ATM to the side of the Federal Reserve.

“You’re borrowing at zero, putting it out there at two or three percent, with hundreds of billions of dollars — man, you can make a lot of money that way,” says the manager of one prominent hedge fund. “It’s free money.” Which goes a long way to explaining Goldman’s enormous profits last year. But all that free money was amplified by another scam:

THE PIG IN THE POKE

At one point or another, pretty much everyone who takes drugs has been burned by this one, also known as the “Rocks in the Box” scam or, in its more elaborate variations, the “Jamaican Switch.” Someone sells you what looks like an eightball of coke in a baggie, you get home and, you dumbass, it’s baby powder.

The scam’s name comes from the Middle Ages, when some fool would be sold a bound and gagged pig that he would see being put into a bag; he’d miss the switch, then get home and find a tied-up cat in there instead. Hence the expression “Don’t let the cat out of the bag.”

The “Pig in the Poke” scam is another key to the entire bailout era. After the crash of the housing bubble — the largest asset bubble in history — the economy was suddenly flooded with securities backed by failing or near-failing home loans. In the cleanup phase after that bubble burst, the whole game was to get taxpayers, clients and shareholders to buy these worthless cats, but at pig prices.

One of the first times we saw the scam appear was in September 2008, right around the time that AIG was imploding. That was when the Fed changed some of its collateral rules, meaning banks that could once borrow only against sound collateral, like Treasury bills or AAA-rated corporate bonds, could now borrow against pretty much anything — including some of the mortgage-backed sewage that got us into this mess in the first place. In other words, banks that once had to show a real pig to borrow from the Fed could now show up with a cat and get pig money. “All of a sudden, banks were allowed to post absolute shit to the Fed’s balance sheet,” says the manager of the prominent hedge fund.

The Fed spelled it out on September 14th, 2008, when it changed the collateral rules for one of its first bailout facilities — the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, or PDCF. The Fed’s own write-up described the changes: “With the Fed’s action, all the kinds of collateral then in use . . . including non-investment-grade securities and equities . . . became eligible for pledge in the PDCF.”

Translation: We now accept cats.

The Pig in the Poke also came into play in April of last year, when Congress pushed a little-known agency called the Financial Accounting Standards Board, or FASB, to change the so-called “mark-to-market” accounting rules. Until this rule change, banks had to assign a real-market price to all of their assets. If they had a balance sheet full of securities they had bought at $3 that were now only worth $1, they had to figure their year-end accounting using that $1 value. In other words, if you were the dope who bought a cat instead of a pig, you couldn’t invite your shareholders to a slate of pork dinners come year-end accounting time.

But last April, FASB changed all that. From now on, it announced, banks could avoid reporting losses on some of their crappy cat investments simply by declaring that they would “more likely than not” hold on to them until they recovered their pig value. In short, the banks didn’t even have to actually hold on to the toxic shit they owned — they just had to sort of promise to hold on to it.

That’s why the “profit” numbers of a lot of these banks are really a joke. In many cases, we have absolutely no idea how many cats are in their proverbial bag. What they call “profits” might really be profits, only minus undeclared millions or billions in losses.

“They’re hiding all this stuff from their shareholders,” says Ritholtz, who was disgusted that the banks lobbied for the rule changes. “Now, suddenly banks that were happy to mark to market on the way up don’t have to mark to market on the way down.”

THE RUMANIAN BOX

One of the great innovations of Victor Lustig, the legendary Depression-era con man who wrote the famous “Ten Commandments for Con Men,” was a thing called the “Rumanian Box.” This was a little machine that a mark would put a blank piece of paper into, only to see real currency come out the other side.  The brilliant Lustig sold this Rumanian Box over and over again for vast sums — but he’s been outdone by the modern barons of Wall Street, who managed to get themselves a real Rumanian Box.

How they accomplished this is a story that by itself highlights the challenge of placing this era in any kind of historical context of known financial crime. What the banks did was something that was never — and never could have been — thought of before. They took so much money from the government, and then did so little with it, that the state was forced to start printing new cash to throw at them. Even the great Lustig in his wildest, horniest dreams could never have dreamed up this one.

The setup: By early 2009, the banks had already replenished themselves with billions if not trillions in bailout money. It wasn’t just the $700 billion in TARP cash, the free money provided by the Fed, and the untold losses obscured by accounting tricks. Another new rule allowed banks to collect interest on the cash they were required by law to keep in reserve accounts at the Fed — meaning the state was now compensating the banks simply for guaranteeing their own solvency. And a new federal operation called the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program let insolvent and near-insolvent banks dispense with their deservedly ruined credit profiles and borrow on a clean slate, with FDIC backing. Goldman borrowed $29 billion on the government’s good name, J.P. Morgan Chase $38 billion, and Bank of America $44 billion. “TLGP,” says Prins, the former Goldman manager, “was a big one.”

Collectively, all this largesse was worth trillions. The idea behind the flood of money, from the government’s standpoint, was to spark a national recovery: We refill the banks’ balance sheets, and they, in turn, start to lend money again, recharging the economy and producing jobs. “The banks were fast approaching insolvency,” says Rep. Paul Kanjorski, a vocal critic of Wall Street who nevertheless defends the initial decision to bail out the banks. “It was vitally important that we recapitalize these institutions.”

But here’s the thing. Despite all these trillions in government rescues, despite the Fed slashing interest rates down to nothing and showering the banks with mountains of guarantees, Goldman and its friends had still not jump-started lending again by the first quarter of 2009. That’s where those nuclear-powered balls of Lloyd Blankfein came into play, as Goldman and other banks basically threatened to pick up their bailout billions and go home if the government didn’t fork over more cash — a lot more.

“Even if the Fed could make interest rates negative, that wouldn’t necessarily help,” warned Goldman’s chief domestic economist, Jan Hatzius. “We’re in a deep recession mainly because the private sector, for a variety of reasons, has decided to save a lot more.”

Translation: You can lower interest rates all you want, but we’re still not fucking lending the bailout money to anyone in this economy. Until the government agreed to hand over even more goodies, the banks opted to join the rest of the “private sector” and “save” the taxpayer aid they had received — in the form of bonuses and compensation.

The ploy worked. In March of last year, the Fed sharply expanded a radical new program called quantitative easing, which effectively operated as a real-live Rumanian Box. The government put stacks of paper in one side, and out came $1.2 trillion “real” dollars.

The government used some of that freshly printed money to prop itself up by purchasing Treasury bonds — a desperation move, since Washington’s demand for cash was so great post-Clusterfuck ’08 that even the Chinese couldn’t buy U.S. debt fast enough to keep America afloat. But the Fed used most of the new cash to buy mortgage-backed securities in an effort to spur home lending — instantly creating a massive market for major banks.

And what did the banks do with the proceeds? Among other things, they bought Treasury bonds, essentially lending the money back to the government, at interest. The money that came out of the magic Rumanian Box went from the government back to the government, with Wall Street stepping into the circle just long enough to get paid. And once quantitative easing ends, as it is scheduled to do in March, the flow of money for home loans will once again grind to a halt. The Mortgage Bankers Association expects the number of new residential mortgages to plunge by 40 percent this year.

THE BIG MITT

All of that Rumanian box paper was made even more valuable by running it through the next stage of the grift. Michael Masters, one of the country’s leading experts on commodities trading, compares this part of the scam to the poker game in the Bill Murray comedy Stripes. “It’s like that scene where John Candy leans over to the guy who’s new at poker and says, ‘Let me see your cards,’ then starts giving him advice,” Masters says. “He looks at the hand, and the guy has bad cards, and he’s like, ‘Bluff me, come on! If it were me, I’d bet everything!’ That’s what it’s like. It’s like they’re looking at your cards as they give you advice.”

In more ways than one can count, the economy in the bailout era turned into a “Big Mitt,” the con man’s name for a rigged poker game. Everybody was indeed looking at everyone else’s cards, in many cases with state sanction. Only taxpayers and clients were left out of the loop.

At the same time the Fed and the Treasury were making massive, earthshaking moves like quantitative easing and TARP, they were also consulting regularly with private advisory boards that include every major player on Wall Street. The Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee has a J.P. Morgan executive as its chairman and a Goldman executive as its vice chairman, while the board advising the Fed includes bankers from Capital One and Bank of New York Mellon. That means that, in addition to getting great gobs of free money, the banks were also getting clear signals about when they were getting that money, making it possible to position themselves to make the appropriate investments.

One of the best examples of the banks blatantly gambling, and winning, on government moves was the Public-Private Investment Program, or PPIP. In this bizarre scheme cooked up by goofball-geek Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, the government loaned money to hedge funds and other private investors to buy up the absolutely most toxic horseshit on the market — the same kind of high-risk, high-yield mortgages that were most responsible for triggering the financial chain reaction in the fall of 2008. These satanic deals were the basic currency of the bubble: Jobless dope fiends bought houses with no money down, and the big banks wrapped those mortgages into securities and then sold them off to pensions and other suckers as investment-grade deals. The whole point of the PPIP was to get private investors to relieve the banks of these dangerous assets before they hurt any more innocent bystanders.

But what did the banks do instead, once they got wind of the PPIP? They started buying that worthless crap again, presumably to sell back to the government at inflated prices! In the third quarter of last year, Goldman, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup and Bank of America combined to add $3.36 billion of exactly this horseshit to their balance sheets.

This brazen decision to gouge the taxpayer startled even hardened market observers. According to Michael Schlachter of the investment firm Wilshire Associates, it was “absolutely ridiculous” that the banks that were supposed to be reducing their exposure to these volatile instruments were instead loading up on them in order to make a quick buck. “Some of them created this mess,” he said, “and they are making a killing undoing it.”

THE WIRE

Here’s the thing about our current economy. When Goldman and Morgan Stanley transformed overnight from investment banks into commercial banks, we were told this would mean a new era of “significantly tighter regulations and much closer supervision by bank examiners,” as The New York Times put it the very next day. In reality, however, the conversion of Goldman and Morgan Stanley simply completed the dangerous concentration of power and wealth that began in 1999, when Congress repealed the Glass-Steagall Act — the Depression-era law that had prevented the merger of insurance firms, commercial banks and investment houses. Wall Street and the government became one giant dope house, where a few major players share valuable information between conflicted departments the way junkies share needles.

One of the most common practices is a thing called front-running, which is really no different from the old “Wire” con, another scam popularized in The Sting. But instead of intercepting a telegraph wire in order to bet on racetrack results ahead of the crowd, what Wall Street does is make bets ahead of valuable information they obtain in the course of everyday business.

Say you’re working for the commodities desk of a big investment bank, and a major client — a pension fund, perhaps — calls you up and asks you to buy a billion dollars of oil futures for them. Once you place that huge order, the price of those futures is almost guaranteed to go up. If the guy in charge of asset management a few desks down from you somehow finds out about that, he can make a fortune for the bank by betting ahead of that client of yours. The deal would be instantaneous and undetectable, and it would offer huge profits. Your own client would lose money, of course — he’d end up paying a higher price for the oil futures he ordered, because you would have driven up the price. But that doesn’t keep banks from screwing their own customers in this very way.

The scam is so blatant that Goldman Sachs actually warns its clients that something along these lines might happen to them. In the disclosure section at the back of a research paper the bank issued on January 15th, Goldman advises clients to buy some dubious high-yield bonds while admitting that the bank itself may bet against those same shitty bonds. “Our salespeople, traders and other professionals may provide oral or written market commentary or trading strategies to our clients and our proprietary trading desks that reflect opinions that are contrary to the opinions expressed in this research,” the disclosure reads. “Our asset management area, our proprietary-trading desks and investing businesses may make investment decisions that are inconsistent with the recommendations or views expressed in this research.”

Banks like Goldman admit this stuff openly, despite the fact that there are securities laws that require banks to engage in “fair dealing with customers” and prohibit analysts from issuing opinions that are at odds with what they really think. And yet here they are, saying flat-out that they may be issuing an opinion at odds with what they really think.

To help them screw their own clients, the major investment banks employ high-speed computer programs that can glimpse orders from investors before the deals are processed and then make trades on behalf of the banks at speeds of fractions of a second. None of them will admit it, but everybody knows what this computerized trading — known as “flash trading” — really is. “Flash trading is nothing more than computerized front-running,” says the prominent hedge-fund manager. The SEC voted to ban flash trading in September, but five months later it has yet to issue a regulation to put a stop to the practice.

Over the summer, Goldman suffered an embarrassment on that score when one of its employees, a Russian named Sergey Aleynikov, allegedly stole the bank’s computerized trading code. In a court proceeding after Aleynikov’s arrest, Assistant U.S. Attorney Joseph Facciponti reported that “the bank has raised the possibility that there is a danger that somebody who knew how to use this program could use it to manipulate markets in unfair ways.”

Six months after a federal prosecutor admitted in open court that the Goldman trading program could be used to unfairly manipulate markets, the bank released its annual numbers. Among the notable details was the fact that a staggering 76 percent of its revenue came from trading, both for its clients and for its own account. “That is much, much higher than any other bank,” says Prins, the former Goldman managing director. “If I were a client and I saw that they were making this much money from trading, I would question how badly I was getting screwed.”

Why big institutional investors like pension funds continually come to Wall Street to get raped is the million-dollar question that many experienced observers puzzle over. Goldman’s own explanation for this phenomenon is comedy of the highest order. In testimony before a government panel in January, Blankfein was confronted about his firm’s practice of betting against the same sorts of investments it sells to clients. His response: “These are the professional investors who want this exposure.”

In other words, our clients are big boys, so screw ’em if they’re dumb enough to take the sucker bets I’m offering.

THE RELOAD

Not many con men are good enough or brazen enough to con the same victim twice in a row, but the few who try have a name for this excellent sport: reloading. The usual way to reload on a repeat victim (called an “addict” in grifter parlance) is to rope him into trying to get back the money he just lost. This is exactly what started to happen late last year.

It’s important to remember that the housing bubble itself was a classic confidence game — the Ponzi scheme. The Ponzi scheme is any scam in which old investors must be continually paid off with money from new investors to keep up what appear to be high rates of investment return. Residential housing was never as valuable as it seemed during the bubble; the soaring home values were instead a reflection of a continual upward rush of new investors in mortgage-backed securities, a rush that finally collapsed in 2008.

But by the end of 2009, the unimaginable was happening: The bubble was re-inflating. A bailout policy that was designed to help us get out from under the bursting of the largest asset bubble in history inadvertently produced exactly the opposite result, as all that government-fueled capital suddenly began flowing into the most dangerous and destructive investments all over again. Wall Street was going for the reload.

A lot of this was the government’s own fault, of course. By slashing interest rates to zero and flooding the market with money, the Fed was replicating the historic mistake that Alan Greenspan had made not once, but twice, before the tech bubble in the early 1990s and before the housing bubble in the early 2000s. By making sure that traditionally safe investments like CDs and savings accounts earned basically nothing, thanks to rock-bottom interest rates, investors were forced to go elsewhere to search for moneymaking opportunities.

Now we’re in the same situation all over again, only far worse. Wall Street is flooded with government money, and interest rates that are not just low but flat are pushing investors to seek out more “creative” opportunities. (It’s “Greenspan times 10,” jokes one hedge-fund trader.) Some of that money could be put to use on Main Street, of course, backing the efforts of investment-worthy entrepreneurs. But that’s not what our modern Wall Street is built to do. “They don’t seem to want to lend to small and medium-sized business,” says Rep. Brad Sherman, who serves on the House Financial Services Committee. “What they want to invest in is marketable securities. And the definition of small and medium-sized businesses, for the most part, is that they don’t have marketable securities. They have bank loans.”

In other words, unless you’re dealing with the stock of a major, publicly traded company, or a giant pile of home mortgages, or the bonds of a large corporation, or a foreign currency, or oil futures, or some country’s debt, or anything else that can be rapidly traded back and forth in huge numbers, factory-style, by big banks, you’re not really on Wall Street’s radar.

So with small business out of the picture, and the safe stuff not worth looking at thanks to the Fed’s low interest rates, where did Wall Street go? Right back into the shit that got us here.

One trader, who asked not to be identified, recounts a story of what happened with his hedge fund this past fall. His firm wanted to short — that is, bet against — all the crap toxic bonds that were suddenly in vogue again. The fund’s analysts had examined the fundamentals of these instruments and concluded that they were absolutely not good investments.

So they took a short position. One month passed, and they lost money. Another month passed — same thing. Finally, the trader just shrugged and decided to change course and buy.

“I said, ‘Fuck it, let’s make some money,'” he recalls. “I absolutely did not believe in the fundamentals of any of this stuff. However, I can get on the bandwagon, just so long as I know when to jump out of the car before it goes off the damn cliff!”

This is the very definition of bubble economics — betting on crowd behavior instead of on fundamentals. It’s old investors betting on the arrival of new ones, with the value of the underlying thing itself being irrelevant. And this behavior is being driven, no surprise, by the biggest firms on Wall Street.

The research report published by Goldman Sachs on January 15th underlines this sort of thinking. Goldman issued a strong recommendation to buy exactly the sort of high-yield toxic crap our hedge-fund guy was, by then, driving rapidly toward the cliff.

“Summarizing our views,” the bank wrote, “we expect robust flows . . . to dominate fundamentals.” In other words: This stuff is crap, but everyone’s buying it in an awfully robust way, so you should too. Just like tech stocks in 1999, and mortgage-backed securities in 2006.

To sum up, this is what Lloyd Blankfein meant by “performance”: Take massive sums of money from the government, sit on it until the government starts printing trillions of dollars in a desperate attempt to restart the economy, buy even more toxic assets to sell back to the government at inflated prices — and then, when all else fails, start driving us all toward the cliff again with a frank and open endorsement of bubble economics. I mean, shit — who wouldn’t deserve billions in bonuses for doing all that?

Con artists have a word for the inability of their victims to accept that they’ve been scammed. They call it the “True Believer Syndrome.” That’s sort of where we are, in a state of nagging disbelief about the realproblem on Wall Street.

It isn’t so much that we have inadequate rules or incompetent regulators, although both of these things are certainly true. The real problem is that it doesn’t matter what regulations are in place if the people running the economy are rip-off artists. The system assumes a certain minimum level of ethical behavior and civic instinct over and above what is spelled out by the regulations. If those ethics are absent — well, this thing isn’t going to work, no matter what we do. Sure, mugging old ladies is against the law, but it’s also easy. To prevent it, we depend, for the most part, not on cops but on people making the conscious decision not to do it.

That’s why the biggest gift the bankers got in the bailout was not fiscal but psychological. “The most valuable part of the bailout,” says Rep. Sherman, “was the implicit guarantee that they’re Too Big to Fail.” Instead of liquidating and prosecuting the insolvent institutions that took us all down with them in a giant Ponzi scheme, we have showered them with money and guarantees and all sorts of other enabling gestures. And what should really freak everyone out is the fact that Wall Street immediately started skimming off its own rescue money. If the bailouts validated anew the crooked psychology of the bubble, the recent profit and bonus
numbers show that the same psychology is back, thriving, and looking for new disasters to create. “It’s evidence,” says Rep. Kanjorski, “that they still don’t get it.”

More to the point, the fact that we haven’t done much of anything to change the rules and behavior of Wall Street shows that we still don’t get it. Instituting a bailout policy that stressed recapitalizing bad banks was like the addict coming back to the con man to get his lost money back. Ask yourself how well that ever works out. And then get ready for the reload.

[From Issue 1099 — March 4, 2010]

Never forget, it was Goldman’s Lloyd Blankfein who infamously claimed that banks are “doing god’s work”.

The question we all should be asking is, “Exactly which ‘god’ do bankers worship?!?”

It is disheartening to observe that here in our own country, we still have hordes of intelligent folks who think the member for Goldman Sachs, Malcolm Turnbull, is the greatest political leader in the nation, and long to see him in the nation’s highest office.

The same bloke who once advised a former Goldman associate, and now-prominent Oz housing bubble profiteer, that “You capitalise on chaos”.

Wealth, Virtual Wealth, And Debt

22 Feb

03WORLD-articleLarge

Yes, I do bang on a lot about bank(ster)ing, usury, and debt slavery. But I am far from the first.

Mankind has known of these great evils for millennia.

Literally, for thousands of years.

Great wise men have preached against the parasitic slave trade of the money-lenders throughout the ages.

Plato, Aristotle, Cato, Cicero, Seneca, Moses, Philo, Buddha, Jesus – all denounced the evil of money-lending at interest. The only Biblically-recorded instance of Jesus Christ resorting to violence, was when he chased the money-lenders out of the Temple with a whip.

And yet, in our so-called “Information Age”, when billions have access to heretofore unimaginable storehouses of historical records, books, and information, it almost seems as though humanity is further away than ever from having a solid understanding of HOW the dark worlds of “money” and “banking” really work.

Here are some quotes (bold added) from the writings of Frederick Soddy in the early 20th century (h/t Monetary Realism via Pragmatic Capitalism):

“THE PRIVATE ISSUE OF MONEY; A CHANCE RESULT OF THE BANK CHEQUE SYSTEM

No doubt there are still many people, if not the majority, who will be frankly incredulous that money vastly exceeding in amount the total national money can be, and is created and destroyed by the moneylender with a stroke of the pen. How frequently does one still read in the Press that the banks can only loan their customers spare money! Most people still think of what money once was, “a public instrument owned and controlled by the State.””

“Wealth, Virtual Wealth, And Debt”, p. 147, published 1926

“This book will show what money now is, what it does, and what it should do. From this it will emerge the recognition of what has always been the true rôle of money. The standpoint from which most books on modern money are written has been reversed. In this book it is not treated from the point of view of bankers—as those who create by far the greater proportion of money—but from that of the PUBLIC, who at present have to give up valuable goods and services to the bankers in return for the money that they have so cleverly created and create. This, surely, is what the public really wants to know about money.

It was recognised in Athens and Sparta ten centuries ago before the birth of Christ that one of the most vital prerogatives of the State was the sole right to issue money. How curious that the unique quality of this prerogative is only now being rediscovered. The “money power” which has been able to overshadow ostensibly responsible government, is not the power of the merely ultra-rich, but is nothing more nor less than a new technique designed to create and destroy money by adding and withdrawing figures in bank ledgers, without the slightest concern for the interests of the community or the real rôle that money ought to perform therein.”

Page x: “To allow it to become a source of revenues to private issuers is to create, first, a secret and illicit arm of the government and, last, a rival power strong enough ultimately to overthrow all other forms of government.”

– “The Role of Money”, p. ix-x, published 1934

“The Banker as Ruler.

—From that invention dates the modern era of the banker as ruler. The whole world after that was his for the taking. By the work of pure scientist the laws of conservation of matter and energy were established, and the new ways of life created which depended upon the contemptuous denial of primitive and puerile aspirations as perpetual motion and the ability ever really to get something for nothing. The whole marvellous civilisation that has sprung from that physical basis has been handed over, lock, stock, and barrel, to those who could not give and have not given the world as much as a bun without first robbing somebody else of it… The skilled creators of wealth [in industry and agriculture] are now become hewers of wood and drawers of water to the creators of debt, who have been doing in secret what they have condemned in public as unsound and immoral finance and have always refused to allow Governments and nations to do openly and above aboard. This without exaggeration is the most gargantuan farce that history has ever staged.”

– “The Role of Money”, p. 51, published 1934

Ever here someone insist that government “printing” money is always a terrible, idiotic thing?

Private banks do it. Every single day. And make vast profits from doing so.

In the modern technological age, it is even easier for the banks than in Soddy’s day. There’s no longer any need to waste paper and ink writing down their ledger entries.

The “money” that banks create today, is just typed into a computer, every time a new loan is made.

“Genuine and Fictitious Loans.

—For a loan, if it is a genuine loan, does not make a deposit, because what the borrower gets the lender gives up, and there is no increase in the quantity of money, but only an alteration in the identity of the individual owners of it. But if the lender gives up nothing at all what the borrower receives is a new issue of money and the quantity is proportionately increased. So elaborately has the real nature of this ridiculous proceeding been surrounded with confusion by some of the cleverest and most skilful advocates the world has ever known, that it is still something of a mystery to ordinary people, who hold their heads and confess they are “unable to understand finance.” It is not intended that they should.”

– “The Role of Money”, p. 62-3, published 1934

My view?

The human race is doomed to experience the darkest dystopian future imagined by any ancient prophet, seer, or modern “science fiction” novelist.

We are within sniffing distance of the worst “Big Brother” Orwellian nightmares.

That is our fate.

Unless the exclusive, government-legislated power to create “money” is taken away from private and quasi-“government” institutions – meaning, banks and central banks.

Because that is where the ultimate physical power in the world rests.

With the creators of “money”.

For them to lose that power, requires education.

It requires people who do understand how the “money” enslavement system works, to share that knowledge with people who don’t.

Even if they do not want to hear it. Which most do not – the truth is often very uncomfortable.

Ultimately, it requires alternatives.

New “money” solutions that inherently decentralise the power of money.

Perhaps even something like this –

The People’s NWO – Every Man His Own Central Banker

“Banks Are Frauds”: Insider

21 Feb

As I was saying.

From The Sovereign Man:

Why a banking insider says “It’s time to be very worried”

Despite all the commotion outside, I met up with my colleague, and we dove immediately into a conversation about international banking and the state of the global financial system. As a senior executive of a large international bank, he is the ultimate insider. And I was floored by what he told me.

He openly acknowledged, for example, that banks are frauds. Most banks, particularly in the developed west, only hold a tiny fraction of their customer’s deposits in cash. The rest is gambled away on whatever the popular toxic security du jour happens to be.

This entire system rests upon a very thin layer of confidence, reinforced by the occasional taxpayer bailout. Yet it struck him as incredible that people still had confidence in banks, especially given that most of the investment products promoted to their customers are “crap”.

He told me how destructive central bankers are, creating untold amounts of inflation that only serves to make people poorer, while enabling governments to go deeper into debt.

Most of all, he told me that very few of the banking sector’s underlying deficiencies have been addressed since the 2008 meltdown. Many western banks are still insolvent, with the key difference that their governments are now also insolvent.

He believes that in the coming years, this confluence of risk will finally burst, most likely induced by the effects of the currency wars and competitive devaluation.

It was astounding, he said, that the G7 actually published a statement trying to soothe concerns about the global currency wars. “Whenever the government tells you to not worry about something,” he said, “it’s time to be very worried.”

Unfortunately, most people don’t know what’s happening. They don’t know that their government is insolvent, and that the only way they can persist is to go deeper into debt and devalue their currency. They don’t know that the money in their bank account isn’t safe. And they don’t have any idea how far their government will go to maintain the status quo.

It turns out that the screaming teenagers outside were a perfect metaphor. Happily ignorant. Distracted. And completely unaware. Most people simply aren’t going to see it coming.

And yet, from a big picture perspective, it all seems so obvious. National balance sheets across the developed west are deeply in the red. Bank balance sheets are precarious at best. Central bankers are flooding the world with paper money. And governments are trying everything– capital controls, competitive devaluation, pension nationalization– to keep the party going.

The writing is on the wall.

Read the whole article here.

The Biggest Drag On Our Economy

20 Feb

ball-and-chain

What do you think is the biggest drag on our economy?

If you said “usury“, welcome to Club Classically Correct.

Usury is not, as so many would have you believe, the charging of an excessive rate of interest.

That is the modern definition. Banker approved.

The classical definition of usury is commonly attributed to Aristotle:

“There are two sorts of wealth-getting, as I have said; one is a part of household management, the other is retail trade: the former necessary and honorable, while that which consists in exchange is justly censured; for it is unnatural, and a mode by which men gain from one another. The most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the natural object of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at interest. And this term interest (tokos), which means the birth of money from money, is applied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the parent. Wherefore of any modes of getting wealth this is the most unnatural.”

– Aristotle, c. 350BC (Politics, Book I, Part X)

Today, our modern “money” system is the pinnacle of the money-lenders’ art.

Or should I say rather, the money-lenders’ “artifice”:

ar·ti·fice
[ahr-tuh-fis]
noun
1. a clever trick or stratagem; a cunning, crafty device or expedient; wile.
2. trickery; guile; craftiness.
3. cunning; ingenuity; inventiveness: a drawing-room comedy crafted with artifice and elegance.
4. a skillful or artful contrivance or expedient.

The vast majority (around 97%) of “money” is simply electronic digits.

Digital bookkeeping entries.

Created by the banking system, every time a person signs up for a new (or bigger) loan.

(See The World’s Most Immoral Institution Tells You How + Think You’ve Got Cash In The Bank? Think Again)

And here is the key to the usurers’ immense power and wealth. They have been given the exclusive rights not just to create this digital “money” in the form of debt that must be repaid. You have to pay back those digital bookkeeping entries with interest.

It is interest – usury – that is the biggest drag on our economy.

Consider this.

According to the ABS, the average size loan for a first home buyer in Australia reached an all-time high $293,900 in December 2012. A typical variable home loan rate right now is 5.6% – that’s with the RBA’s official interest rate at record “emergency” lows, mind you. According to ASIC’s “MoneySmart” online calculator, taking out such a loan right now, and repaying $2,000 a month for the next 20 years and 9 months, would result in your repaying the bank $203,598 in usury alone.

Of course, this assumes that interest rates did not rise in the next 20-something years. If (when) they do, then so too does the amount of usury you must repay to the bank.

Just the other day I was wondering, “Has anyone ever bothered to calculate the total value of one year’s worth of usury repayments, on all home loans in the Australian economy”?

To be frank, I have neither the skills nor the knowledge to make an accurate calculation.

But it is not hard to work out a very rough approximation.  Something that helps give some idea of just what a drag on the economy the repayment of usury on the banks’ digital bookkeeping entries must be.

According to the RBA, at December 2012 the Australian banking system claimed a total $1.136 Trillion in residential loan “Assets”.

(Yes, that’s right. Your signature on a loan document, pledging yourself to decades of debt slavery to repay the bank their digits, is considered the bank’s “Asset”)

According to Canstar’s variable rate home loan comparison chart, a variable mortgage rate of around 5.6% would appear fairly typical right now.

So, as a very basic approximation, if the total value of all the banks’ mortgage “assets” at end December 2012 were on the variable rate of usury, thus earning the banks 5.6% p.a., then (ignoring compounding, which makes the total even higher) the banks’ would stand to earn $63.6 billion in usury on home loans in 2013.

Just imagine all the far better, more productive and valuable uses that much “money” could be put to in 2013 by Aussie households.

Now again, I stress my lack of knowledge on this data. For all I know, the value of expected usury repayments may already be included in the RBA’s total of banks’ mortgage “assets”.

If so, it matters very little. Even a mere 5.6% compound interest on >$1 Trillion in mortgage debts, is a huge annual sum.

Clearly, the drag on the economy from the burden of repaying usury to the bankers on home loans alone, is truly staggering. EPIC.

And when we consider that banks have done nothing to deserve this exclusive right to profit from our lifetime labours, the truth of Aristotle’s observation is only the more clear.

Of any modes of getting wealth, usury is indeed the most unnatural.

Greens True Colour Is A “Consistent Red”

20 Feb

Paul Kelly tells it like it is:

CHRISTINE Milne’s busting of the Labor-Greens alliance proves the Greens are Labor’s political enemy and that Julia Gillard should never have entered this deal in the first place.

With the Prime Minister in her weakest hour, the Greens have sunk in the boot. Perfect timing. Some friends. Some allies.

With the election near, the alliance has exhausted its utility. Both sides are looking to product differentiation as campaign rivals.

Milne’s decision has nothing to with principle and everything to do with the Greens’ electoral needs. It makes no difference to the parliament, but it shows the Greens are as cynical, expedient and unscrupulous as the major parties. Their claims to superior morality are a joke.

Kelly’s article is headlined “Greens showing their true colours”.

Which got me wondering.

Paul Kelly is right. The Greens’ claims to superior morality are a joke.

Clearly, they are just as self-serving as all the rest.

And so, as the political party of choice for the resurgent religion of paganism, I thought it might be interesting to see just what colour a pagan would assign to “selfishness” in a person’s “aura” –

A Consistent Red: A consistent dark red indicates a violent nature, a selfish and deceitful attitude.

Sounds right.

The Greens have consistently had an aura of deep red about them.

 

One Chart Debunks Wayne’s Lies On Interest Rates

20 Feb
Click to enlarge

Click to enlarge

Treasurer Wayne Swan has never tired of telling the Australian people that interest rate cuts are a sign of the government’s good economic management:

Dec 4, 2012 – Treasurer Wayne Swan says the central bank’s decision to cut the cash interest rate follows the federal government’s prudent management…

“Today’s rate cut from the Reserve Bank is the early Christmas present that hard-working Aussies deserve,” Mr Swan told reporters in Canberra.

“We’ve now had the equivalent of seven rate cuts over the past year and of course that’s been made possible by the government’s economic management, strong budget management and of course, contained inflation.”

I could include many more examples. Except there would be no point. If you have heard Swan making these self-congratulatory noises once, you have heard it many times.

The truth, of course, is completely different.

When interest rates are cut, it is not a sign of good economic management.

It is a warning sign that things are going to poo:

Dec 4, 2012 – The Reserve Bank has cut the cash rate to its lowest level since the global financial crisis, following a raft of weak economic data that showed pessimism in the jobs market, a slowdown in mining activity and lower-than-expected retail sales.

The RBA cut the cash rate by 25 basis points, or 0.25 percentage points, to 3 per cent, which is the lowest the rate has been since the central bank started setting rates in 1990.

It matches the setting in April 2009 at the peak of the GFC, when the global financial system was in meltdown and the RBA was trying to prevent Australia slipping into recession.

That’s right. It is the important fact that Wayne and the rest of the Labor Party are conveniently forgetting to mention. The present official interest rate is deemed by the RBA to be an “emergency low”.

Take another look at the chart above.

See that little bump up, brief plateau, then fall in interest rates following the big GFC cliff dive?

Technical chart analysts call that a “dead cat bounce”.

2010-314--political-party-dead-cat-bounce-

Now, lest any reader think to accuse your humble blogger of partisan bias against Wayne and the ALP, let us not forget the LP’s history of lying on this topic.

Many will recall John Howard’s claim that “interest rates will always be lower under a Coalition government than under a Labor government”.

Think about this.

If that were true – and the chart above proves it is not – then what Howard was really saying is that “the economy will always be weaker under a Coalition government than under a Labor government”.

The usury rate formula is very simple to understand.

When the economy is strong, the vested usurers raise usury rates, to increase their profits.

When the economy is weak, they reduce usury rates, to “support the economy”. That is, to prevent their Ponzi scheme from imploding.

When interest rates are falling, it is not a great time to take out a loan. Despite what the vested usurers and their many mouthpieces in the media and real estate sales industry tell you.

It is arguably the worst time to take out a loan.

It is a warning sign that the economy is weak. That unemployment is likely to rise. That your job may be at risk in coming months.

And that the vested usurers are on the back foot, trying to prop up their Ponzi scheme.

DON’T BORROW NOW!!

 

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